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Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy
in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is ‘crowding
type,’ which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to
the jurisdiction (coalition or firm) the agent joins. The second is taste type,
which is not publicly observable, has no direct eﬀects on others and is defined
over private good, public goods and the crowding profile of the jurisdiction
the agent joins. The law of demand suggests that as the quantity of a given
crowding type (plumbers, lawyers, smart people, tall people, nonsmokers, for
example) increases, the compensation that agents of that type receive should
go down. We provide counterexamples, however, that show that some agents
of a given crowding type might actually benefit when the proportion of agents
with the same crowding type increases. This reversal of the law of demand
seems to have to do with an interaction eﬀect between tastes and skills,
something diﬃcult to study without making these classes of characteristics
distinct. We argue that this reversal seems to relate to the degree of diﬀerence
between various patterns of tastes. In particular, if tastes are homogeneous,
the law of demand holds.
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1 Introduction
Tiebout’s (1956) central insight was that many types of public goods are
subject to crowding and congestion. As a result it would be impractical and
ineﬃcient to provide them at the level of national governments. Instead,
amenities like education, police and fire protection are services produced by
local jurisdictions. In choosing where to live, consumers evaluate the bundles
of public goods, taxes and other amenities each jurisdiction oﬀers. In making
their locational choices, in eﬀect they reveal their willingness to pay for public
goods. Thus, the preference revelation and free riding problem pointed out
by Samuelson (1954) for the case of pure public goods disappears in this
economic environment.
Tiebout’s paper stimulated an enormous theoretical literature. Subse-
quent authors have shown that, although eﬃcient Tiebout sorting may not
occur in completely general circumstances, adding economic restrictions that
are natural in the study of clubs or local public goods provide support for
Tiebout’s hypothesis. Wooders (1978), for example, shows that when there is
only one private good , agents crowd each other anonymously (only the num-
bers of agents sharing the public goods matters), and all gains to coalition-
forming are realized in small groups (or coalitions), the core can be decen-
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tralized with anonymous prices. On the other hand, Bewley’s (1981) early
attempt to formalize the Tiebout hypothesis led to largely negative con-
clusions. Bewley shows that, in some cases, anonymous decentralization of
eﬃcient outcomes is not possible and, in other cases, anonymous prices may
only serve to decentralize ineﬃcient outcomes. Bewley’s formalization, how-
ever, has not gained wide acceptance. Key concerns are that in his model the
numbers of jurisdictions are some cases is fixed, public goods are not subject
to congestion, and most important, small groups are not eﬀective (more on
this below).
The local public goods approach to the provision of congestable public
goods centers on agents making a locational choice among competing ju-
risdictions oﬀering distinct public good bundles, and addresses the general
equilibrium question of how the entire population of a large economy can be
best sorted into non-overlapping and exhaustive coalitions. There are, how-
ever, significant classes of congestable goods that are provided by coalitions
not connected to a location. For example, agents join country clubs, fitness
clubs, private schools churches, professional organizations and so in order
to enjoy both the public goods they provide and the company of the other
members. Note that agents can belong to one club, many clubs or even no
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clubs. Thus, unlike the local public goods case, there is no need to require
that the outcome be a partition of the agents. Buchanan (1965) is generally
credited as being the first to write a formal model of clubs, but the roots can
be seen as far back as the early papers on tolls and congested roads by Pigou
(1920) and Knight (1924)
Since Buchanan published his seminal paper the club literature has devel-
oped in several diﬀerent directions. In a model with essentially homogeneous
agents, Pauly (1967, 1970) explored the issue of optimal club size and the
stability of its membership. Tollison (1972), Ng and Tollison (1974), Berglas
(1976), and DeSerpa (1977) present clubs in which crowding is nonanony-
mous. Wooders (1978) considered anonymous crowding and anonymous
prices — prices which do not depend on unobservable characteristics of agents.
McGuire (1974) and Wooders (1978) address whether club membership will
be homogeneous when agents diﬀer in tastes or endowments. Questions of
core and equilibrium existence in club economies arose in works such as Pauly
(1967,1970) and Wooders (1978,1980). Issues involving the potential costs
for excluding unwanted members of an exclusive club are presented by Davis
and Whinston (1967), Millward (1970), Nichols, Smolensky and Tiedman
(1971), Oakland (1972), and Kamien, Swartz and Roberts (1973). Early ex-
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plorations of uncertainty in clubs models include DeVany and Saving (1977)
and Hillman and Swan (1979). More recent directions of investigation include
multiproduct clubs, variable usage, and intergenerational clubs.
In this paper we take on a new question: when will a law of demand
hold for skills or other ‘crowding characteristics’ in coalition economies, and
in particular, in economies with local public goods. For example, will the
compensation that gregarious people experience from joining social groups
decrease if more people become outgoing; will smart college applicants re-
ceive less college aid if the population at large gets smarter, will the wage of
teachers go down if more teachers are trained, and so on. In labor markets
there is a strong intuition that the law of demand should hold. The question
is, does it continue to hold in Tiebout economies?
The central issue we encounter in addressing this question was already
nicely pointed out by Adam Smith (1776):
“The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the diﬀerent employ-
ments of labor and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either perfectly
equal or continually tending to equality. If in the same neighborhood there
was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the
rest, so many people would crowd into it in one case, and so many would
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desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of
other employments.”
As Adam Smith recognized, wage diﬀerentials are required to equalize the
total monetary and non-monetary advantages and disadvantages amongst
alternative employments; a job with favorable conditions can attract labor
at relatively low wages while a job with unfavorable conditions must oﬀer a
compensating wage premium to attract workers. This well known theory of
equalizing diﬀerences, is suggested to be ‘the fundamental market equilibrium
construct in labor economics’1 and is an example of the central question we
will consider in this paper. Clearly, whether this theory holds in Tiebout
economies: clubs with attractive memberships and public goods oﬀerings
can charge more for admission.
The value of a worker’s skills are determined by the market values of the
product he is able to generate. How conditions of employment are valued,
however, depends on the tastes of individual workers. For example, whether
indoor or outdoor work is preferred depends on tastes of workers. If there is
an abundance of workers who prefer to stay indoors, then outdoor work may
fetch a premium. Thus, when we allow for equalizing diﬀerences, the tastes
1S. Rosen (1986).
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of workers become important determinants of labor market equilibrium. We
find that getting the most out of an economy’s resources requires matching
the appropriate type of worker with the appropriate type of firm: “the labor
market must solve a type of marriage problem of slotting workers into their
proper ‘niche’ within and between firms.”2
It is diﬃcult to address the process of assigning workers to firms in a
general equilibrium model since each commodity, including labor, is treated
as a homogeneous good which is allocated to productive uses, without ref-
erence to the agent who supplied it. In other words, there is a structural
de-bundling of the tastes and skills of workers inherent in the model. Under
these circumstances, and given diminishing marginal productively of labor,
one expects a “law of demand” to hold. That is, as the quantity supplied of
a given skill increases the price it receives in equilibrium should go down.
We will therefore explore the law of demand in the context of the crowding
types model introduced in Conley and Wooders (1996, 1997). The advantage
of this model in examining law of demand issues is that it sets up a formal
distinction between the tastes and crowding eﬀects of agents. Crowding
characteristics are publicly observable and generate direct eﬀects on other
2Rosen (1986).
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agents. Crowding characteristics include, for example, gender, whether one
is a smoker, skills and abilities, personality characteristics, appearance, and
languages spoken. Note that some of these characteristics are exogenously
attached to agents (gender) and some are endogenously chosen in response
to market and other incentives (skills and professional qualifications). See
Conley and Wooders (2002) for more discussion of the latter. Tastes, on the
other hand, are assumed to be private information and in themselves produce
no direct eﬀects on other agents.
The key observation underlying the crowding types approach is that an
agent is a bundle of tastes and observable characteristics such as education.
These cannot be taken as independent. Thus, it is the joint distribution
of tastes and crowding types and not their separate distributions that de-
termines the equilibrium outcome of the economy. Modelling this feature
allows us to explore explicitly how the tastes of agents determine the com-
pensating diﬀerentials needed to induce agents to joint diﬀerent jurisdic-
tions/firms/coalitions and in turn to see when a law of demand for skills, for
example, will and will not hold in a Tiebout economy.
To do so, we consider a coalitional economy in which small groups are
strictly eﬀective. Informally, this means that all per capita gains can be
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realized in groups that are small relative to the size of the population and
that no particular type is scarce (and thus might have monopoly power). In
these circumstances the core has the equal treatment property, that is, all
agents of a given type must receive the same utility in any core allocation.
To address whether the law of demand holds, we consider two economies
that diﬀer only in that the number of one particular crowding type is larger in
one than the other. We show that at a core allocation, the law of demand need
not hold. We demonstrate this through a pair of examples; some agents of
the relatively more abundant crowding type may benefit. In fact,.the average
compensation of agents possessing the crowding type that has become more
abundant in the population may go either up or down. For example, if there
is an increase in the number of plumbers in the world, it might be that
plumbers who have a taste for working hot steam tunnels actually benefit
from the overall increase. Similarly, while computer programmers in general
might oppose the free immigration of programmers from India, it might still
be the case that some types of programmers (say game writers) might actually
benefit from this migration.
This failure of the law of demand seems to be due to interactions between
tastes and crowding characteristics and especially to how they are bundled.
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As we will discuss, it is immediate that if all agents have the same tastes,
then the law of demand holds.
2 The model
We consider economies in which agents are described by two characteristics,
their taste types and crowding types. An agent has one of T diﬀerent taste
types, denoted by t ∈ 1, ....., T ≡ T and one of C diﬀerent crowding types,
denoted c ∈ 1, . . . , C ≡ C. We assume no correlation between c and t.
A group of agents is described by a vectorm = (m11, . . . ,mct, . . . ,mCT ) where
mct denotes the number of agents with crowding type c and taste type t
in the group. The crowding profile of a group m is a vector (m1, ...,mC),
where mc =
P
tmct. A crowding profile simply lists the numbers of agents
of each crowding type in the coalition or economy. An economy is deter-
mined by the group of agents N = (N11, . . . , Nct, . . . ,NCT ). A club m =
(m11, . . . ,mct, . . . ,mCT ) ≤ N describes a group of agents whose membership
collectively produces and consumes a public good The set of all feasible clubs
contained in N is denoted by N .
A partition n of the population is a set of clubs {n1, ..., nK} satisfying
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P
k n
k = N . We will write nk ∈ n when a club nk belongs to the partition
n. It will sometimes be useful to refer to an individual agent, denoted by
i ∈ {1, . . . , I} ≡ I, where I = Pc,tNct is the size of the population. We
let θ : I → C × T be a mapping describing the crowding and taste types of
individual agents; thus,
|{i ∈ I, i ∈ N : θ(i)=(c, t)}| = Nct.
We will say an agent i has type (c, t) if θ(i) = (c, t).
With a slight abuse of notation, if agent i is a member of the club de-
scribed by m, we shall write i ∈ m, and if i belongs to the economy deter-
mined by N we write i ∈ N .
An economy has one private good x and club goods y1, y2, ..., yA that
are provided by clubs exclusively for their own memberships. A vector
y = (y1, y2, ..., yA) ∈ RA+ gives club good production. Each agent belongs
to exactly one club. Each agent i ∈ I of taste type t is endowed with
ωt ∈ R+ of the private good and has a quasi linear utility function
ut(x, y,m) = x+ ht(y,m)
where i ∈ m and y is the club good production of club m containing agent i.
The cost in terms of the private good of producing y club good in club with
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membership m is given by a production function
f(y,m).
A particular combination of preferences and endowments for players in
the economy N and production possibilities available to clubs is referred to
as the structure of the economy.
We shall assume preferences satisfy taste anonymity in consumption (TAC),
and production functions satisfy taste anonymity in production (TAP) de-
fined as follows:
TAC: For all m, bm ∈ N , if for all c ∈ C it holds that Ptmct = Pt bmct
then for all x ∈ R+, all y ∈ RA+, and all t ∈ T it holds that (x, y,m) ∼t
(x, y, bm).
TAP: For all m, bm ∈ N , if for all c ∈ C it holds that Ptmct = Pt bmct
then for all y ∈ RA+ it holds that f (y,m) = f (y, bm).
TAC and TAP capture the idea that agents care only about the crowding
types and not the taste types of the agents that are in their respective clubs.
These conditions can be seen as defining crowding types rather than imposing
restrictions on preferences. To illustrate, the cost of production depends on
the skill mix of the people in the jurisdiction, but whether or not skilled
workers like warm or cool climates is of no relevance. As for consumption,
13
we might care about the age of other people but are indiﬀerent to whether or
not they are danger averse.3 We will assume throughout that all economic
structures satisfy both TAC and TAP.
A feasible state of the economy (X, Y, n) ≡ ((x1, . . . , xI), (y1, . . . yK), (n1, . . . nK))
consists of a partition n of the population, an allocation X = (x1, . . . , xI)
of private goods to agents, and a club goods production plan for each club,
Y = (y1, . . . yK), such that
X
k
X
ct
nkctωt −
X
i
xi −
X
k
f (yk, nk) ≥ 0. (1)
We also say that (x, y) is a feasible allocation for a club m if
X
c,t
mctωt −
X
i∈m
xi − f (y,m) ≥ 0
A club m ∈ N producing a feasible allocation (x, y) can improve upon
a feasible state (X, Y, n) if for all i ∈ m,
ut(xi, y,m) > ut(xi, yk, nk). (2)
3You may well indirectly care about the tastes of agents you live with through the
eventual choice of public good y. However, given y, TAC and TAP imply your welfare
does not directly depend on the tastes of other agents.
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where i is of taste type t and, in the original state, i ∈ nk and nk ∈ n.
A feasible state of the economy (X, Y, n) is a core state of the economy or
simply a core state if it cannot be improved upon by any group m acting as
a coalition.4 This simply says that a feasible state is in the core if it is not
possible for a coalition of agents to break away and, using only resources of
its members, provide all its members with preferred consumption bundles.
A utility vector bu ∈ RI is a core utility if, for some core state of the economy
(X,Y, n), ui(xi, yk, nk) = bui.
Since we have restricted to economies with quasi-linear preferences, we
can also define the core entirely in terms of vectors of utilities. Given a club
m ∈ N define v(m) as the maximum total utility that can be achieved by
the club; that is,
v(m) = max
(x,y)
X
i∈m
ut(xi, y,m)
where the maximum is taken over the set of feasible allocations for the club
m. Define V (N) as the maximum total utility that can be achieved by the
4Note that we can define the core as the set of feasible states that cannot be improved
upon by any club (rather than by a coalition forming perhaps multiple clubs) since there
is no benefits to be gained from trade between clubs. This contrasts to work,s such as
Wooders (1989), for example., with multiple private goods
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entire economy when it can partition into jurisdictions; that is,
V (N) = max
X
k
v(nk)
where n = (n1, ..., nK) is a partition of N for some K. It is easy to show that
a utility vector bu ∈ RI is a core utility if and only if
X
i∈m
bui ≥ v(m)
and X
i∈N
bui = V (N).
This paper will focus solely on economies in which small groups are
strictly eﬀective. An economy satisfies strict small group eﬀectiveness, SSGE,
if there exists a positive integer B such that:
1. For all core states (X, Y, n) and all nk ∈ n, it holds that |nk| < B.
2. For all c ∈ C and all t ∈ T it holds that either Nct > B or Nct = 0.
SSGE is a relatively strong formalized version of the sixth assumption in
Tiebout’s paper that there be “an optimal community size” - condition one
stating that any coalition with more than B agents can be improved upon
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while condition two says that this limit of B is small relative to a popu-
lation which contains at least B agents of each type. As recent literature
shows, however, economies satisfying apparently mild conditions can be ap-
proximated by ones satisfying SSGE (cf., Kovalenkov and Wooders 2003 and
references therein).
2.1 Equal treatment
The first result follows immediately from SSGE and shows that any core
state must have the equal treatment property, that is any two agents of the
same type must be equally well oﬀ in any core state.5
Theorem 1: Let (X, Y, n) be a core state of an economy satisfying SSGE.
For any two individuals i, ıˆ ∈ I such that θ(i) = θ(ˆı) = (c, t), if i ∈ nk and
ıˆ ∈ nkˆ then ut(xi, y, nk) = ut(xˆıˆ, yˆ, nkˆ).
Proof. See Conley and Wooders (1997).
One consequence of this result is that with any core state (X, Y, n) we
can associate a vector of payoﬀs u = (u11, ...., uct, ...., uCT ) ∈ RCT where uct
5More general versions of this result appear in Wooders (1983, Theorem 3) and in
Kovalenkov and Wooders (2001).
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is the utility of an agent with crowding type c and taste type t.
Note that Theorem 1 cannot be directly verified by looking at the observ-
able data. Wages received by agents of a given could be widely diﬀerent,
provided the nonobservable nonmonetary compensations of joining a club
oﬀset the wage diﬀerences. The next result provides a directly observable
counterpart to Theorem 1 and is a key feature of the crowding types model.
Theorem 2: Let (X, Y, n) be a core state of an economy satisfying SSGE.
Suppose that for some club nk ∈ n, for some crowding type c ∈ C, and for
two taste types t, t0 ∈ T , both nkct > 0 and nkct0 > 0. Then for all i, j ∈ k such
that θ(i) = (c, t) and θ(j) = (c,bt), it holds that
ωt − xi = ωet − xei ≡ ρc(y
k, nk).
Proof. See Conley and Wooders (1997).
Theorem 2 illustrates that in a core state players of the same crowding
type will be oﬀered the same ‘price’ (which may be positive or negative) to
enter clubs. Thus, there is anonymity in the sense that the prices of club
membership for two individuals who have the same crowding type do not
depend on tastes.
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From now on, given a core state, we will interpret ρc(y,m) as the admis-
sion price for players of crowding type c to enter the club m producing y of
the club good. For the special case of production, or coalition production,
admission prices will generally be negative and are interpreted as the wages
paid by firms to workers.
2.2 Core equivalence
Expanding on the above, a Tiebout price system for crowding type c asso-
ciates to each possible club good level and possible club (containing at least
one player with crowding type c) an admission price, which applies to all
players of crowding type c. Thus, players know the price to join any possible
jurisdiction and we also see that prices are anonymous in the sense that they
do not depend on the tastes of agents.6 A Tiebout price system is simply a
collection of price systems, one for each type, and is denoted by ρ.
We define a Tiebout equilibrium as a feasible state (X, Y, n) ∈ F and a
Tiebout price system ρ such that
1. For all nk ∈ n, all individuals i ∈ nk such that θ(i) = (c, t), all
6Formally we also require that for all m, bm ∈ N , if for all c ∈ C it holds thatPtmct =P
t bmct then for all y it holds that ρ(y,m) = ρ(y, bm).
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alternative clubsm ∈ Nc, and for all levels of public good production y ∈ RA+,
ωt − ρc(y
k, nk) + ht(yk, nk) ≥ ωt − ρc(y,m) + ht(y,m)
2. For all potential clubs m ∈ N and all y ∈ RA+,
X
c,t
mctρc(y,m)− f (y,m) ≤ 0
3. For all nk ∈ n,
X
c,t
nkctρc(y
k, nk)− f(yk, nk) = 0
It can be seen that a Tiebout equilibrium is a decentralized market equi-
librium. Condition 1 states that, given prices to join clubs, every agent is in
his preferred club. Condition 2 states that, given the price system, no new
club could make positive profits while existing clubs make zero profit.7
Under strict small group eﬀectiveness, a strong result can be proven about
the relationship between the core and Tiebout equilibrium.
Theorem 3: If an economy satisfies SSGE then the set of states in the core
of the economy is equivalent to the set of Tiebout equilibrium states.
Proof. See Conley and Wooders (1997).
7From a firm perspective this does not imply that the firm makes zero profit, it means
that any profit has been redistributed to the workers and owners of that firm.
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Theorem 3 confirms that in the crowding types model eﬃcient allocations
can be decentralized through an anonymous price system. Thus, when we
consider firm formation, all workers can choose amongst jobs to maximize
their utilities and the resulting outcome will be an eﬃcient stable outcome
in which workers and firms are optimally matched.8 Note that, unlike the
situation in private goods exchange economies, we have equivalence of core
and equilibrium outcomes in economies with a finite number of agents. This
is due to our assumption of SSGE. There are no new eﬀective clubs that
arise when the economy becomes larger. This is in contrast to situations
as in Wooders (1997) where, for some results, forever increasing returns to
jurisdiction size are allowed.
The crowding types model allows us to consider firm, jurisdiction or region
formation, taking account of both the tastes of workers and their productiv-
ity. As such, it gives us a reasonably complete way to model the theory of
8We note that a major diﬀerence between this result and analogous results for diﬀer-
entiated crowding models as in Wooders (1997), for example, is that prices do not depend
on the tastes of agents, only on their crowding types. Analogous results for models with
anonymous crowding, as in Wooders (1978) and subsequent papers, are special cases of
Theorem 3 since anonymous crowding models are crowding types models but with only
one crowding type.
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equalizing diﬀerences. The rest of the paper uses this model to consider the
relevance of the law of demand when crowding types and taste types are
taken into account.
3 The law of demand
In this section we formally develop both positive and negative results regard-
ing the law of demand. This is done by way of comparative statics exercises
in two economies. These economies have identical technologies and identical
populations of all agents except for one particular crowding type c. The sec-
ond economy has an increased population of crowding type c spread in some
arbitrary way across taste types. Thus, for example, the two economies have
the same number of plumbers who like football, plumbers who like hockey,
plumbers who like baseball, lawyers who like football, lawyers who like base-
ball, etc. However, the second economy might have twice as many doctors
who like football, one additional doctor who likes hockey, and the same num-
ber of doctors who like baseball.
Formally, consider two economies S andGwith agent sets S = (S11, . . . , Sct, . . . , SCT )
andG = (G11, . . . ,Gct, . . . , GCT ), where Sct is interpreted as the total number
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of agents with crowding type c and taste type t in economy S and where Gct
is interpreted as the total number of agents with crowding type c and taste
type t in economy G. The most recent and also the most general versions of
the following result appear in Kovalenkov and Wooders (2005).9 Because of
our assumption of SSGE, the proof below is particularly simple.
Theorem 4: Let S and G be as above and assume both economies satisfy
SSGE. Assume also that there are vectors uS = (uS11, ...., u
S
ct, ...., u
S
CT ) ∈ RCT
and uG = (uG11, ...., u
G
ct, ...., u
G
CT ) ∈ RCT representing core payoﬀs in the equal
treatment core of economies S and G respectively. Then
(uS − uG) · (S −G) ≤ 0.
Proof. From the assumption that uS is the core of the economy S, uS ·m ≥
v(m) for all jurisdictions m with kmk ≤ B. We claim that uS · G ≥ v(G).
Let nG be a partition of G into jurisdictions nGk satisfying knGk k ≤ B for
each jurisdiction and supporting the core allocation uG (for each nGK it holds
that uG · nGk = v(nGk ) and uG · G =
P
k
v(nGk )). Then u
S · m ≥ v(m) for all
9Kovalenkov and Wooders (to appear) provides a detailed discussion of related litera-
ture.
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jurisdictions m implies uS · nGk ≥ v(nGk ) for each k and .
uS ·G =
X
k
uS · nGk ≥
X
k
v(nGk ) = v(G).
Similarly, uG · S ≥ v(S). Also, since uS is a core utility for the economy S
and uG is a core utility for the economy G it holds that uS · S = v(S) and
uG ·G = v(G). We now have
0 ≥ v(G)− uS ·G+ v(S)− uG · S
= uG ·G− uS ·G + uS · S − uG · S
= uG ·G− uS ·G + uS · S − uG · S
= (uS − uG) · (S −G)
The conclusion now follows from some simple algebra.
One immediate consequence of Theorem 4 is that a certeris paribus in-
crease in the number of players with of particular type (that is, a particular
c, t combination) cannot be beneficial to all players of that type.
Corollary 1. Let S and G be as above and assume both economies satisfy
SSGE. Assume also that there are vectors uS = (uS11, ...., u
S
ct, ...., u
S
CT ) ∈ RCT
and uG = (uG11, ...., u
G
ct, ...., u
G
CT ) ∈ RCT representing core payoﬀs in the equal
treatment core of economies S and G respectively. Then, given the core
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vectors uS and uG, if Sct < Gct and Sc0t0 = Gc0t0 for all other types (c0, t0) then
it must hold that
uSct ≥ u
G
ct.
Corollary 1 states that the law of demand applies on a type-by-type basis.
The problem with this is that the taste component of a type is not observable.
Thus, the data cannot tell us anything about the relative increases for agents
of crowding type c of diﬀerent taste types.
One particular case in which we can obtain a law of demand is when all
agents have the same taste types. This case may be important in application
to empirical economics.
Corollary 2. Let S and G be as above and assume both economies satisfy
SSGE. Assume also that for all taste types t and t0 it holds that ut ≡ ut0. Then
if uS = (uS11, ...., u
S
ct, ...., u
S
CT ) ∈ RCT and uG = (uG11, ...., uGct, ...., uGCT ) ∈ RCT
represent core payoﬀs in the equal treatment core of economies S and G
respectively it holds that
1. For each crowding type c it holds that uSct = u
S
ct0 for all t, t
0 and similarly
for uG.
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2. If Sct < Gct and Sc0t0 = Gc0t0 for all other types (c0, t0) then it must hold
that for any t0 that
uSct0 ≥ u
G
ct0.
This can easily been seen since the core vectors given in Theorem 4,
uS = (uS11, ...., u
S
ct, ...., u
S
CT ) ∈ RCT and uG = (uG11, ...., uGct, ...., uGCT ) ∈ RCT will
be in the spaces RC (since T = 1).and the relationship (us−uG)·(S−G) ≤ 0.
will hold. Another situation where the law of demand will hold is where all
agents have the same genetic type and can acquire any crowding type at the
same cost (as in Conley and Wooders 1996). Of course, if there is only one
crowding type (that is, if crowding is anonymous) then the law of demand
will also hold. While these cases may be important empirically, from a
theoretical perspective they are quite narrow.
In view of the observability of crowding types, of particular interest is a
ceteris paribus increase in the number of players with a particular crowding
type. The following result shows that not all agents of a crowding type can
gain from an increase in the numbers of agents with that crowding type.
Corollary 3. If Sct0 ≤ Gct0 for all t0 ∈ T and Sc0t0 = Gc0t0 for all c0 ∈ C, c0 6= c,
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and for all t0 ∈ T then uSct ≥ u
G
ct for at least one type t and, moreover, if
uSct0 < u
G
ct0 for some type t
0 then there exists some t such that uSct > u
G
ct.
One interesting aspect of the Corollary is that if the numbers of agents
of any crowding type c increases while the numbers of agents of every other
crowding type, taste type pair is held constant, if one taste type gains from
the increase then another taste type must loose. We cannot, however, say
what will happen to average payoﬀs of the agents with a particular taste
type, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1:. Suppose that there is only one crowding type and two tastes
types. Agents with taste type 1 like to work agents with taste type 2 gain no
utility from work. A pair of agents can work together and produce output
worth $10.00. If a type 1 agent works he experiences a utility increase just
from working worth $7.00 while a type two agent gains 0 utility from working.
An equal-treatment core utility vector assigns payoﬀ of $12.00 worth of utility
to a player of type 1 and $5.00 to each player of type 2. If the numbers of
agents of taste type 1 increases then core utilities on average increase while
the opposite holds if the numbers of agents of taste type 2 increase. (Note
that for this example, the core will be nonempty only if there is an even
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number of agents but if there are ‘many’ agents, approximate cores will be
nonempty and give most players of type 1 approximately $12.00 and most of
type 2 approximately $5.00 (Wooders 1994, 2004). •
This is a rather trivial example, and could be made more elaborate with-
out changing the point. What it demonstrates is that given the diﬀerences
in how agents value diﬀerent kinds of work situations and so on, the simple
proposition that the average payoﬀs to agents of any given crowding type
must go down as the number of that crowding type increases in the popula-
tion is false.
4 Failures of the law of demand
In this section we provide an that demonstrate that the law of demand need
not hold for all agents when the crowding type they posses increases. This
example considers that case of crowding in consumption. An example that
treats crowding in production is available from the authors upon request.
Example 2: There are 3 taste types - people who like music at work (L),
hate music at work (H) and do not mind some music at work (I). There
are 3 crowding types - people who sing/whistle at work (W), do not sing
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(D) and occasionally sing. (O). People join together to form partnerships
and produce a good, say a building service. Note that all agents are equally
productive in production of the good. An agent’s utility from a partnership
depends on his tastes and the crowding profile of the partnership. The utility
of belonging to a partnership can be detailed:
UH(W,W ) = 0 UL(W,W ) = 4 UH(O,D) = 3 UL(O,D) = 1
UH(W,O) = 1 UL(W,O) = 3 UH(D,D) = 4 UL(D,D) = 0
with all other partnerships giving utility 2. For example, if someone who sings
at work but does not like music at work joins with someone who occasionally
sings he receives payoﬀ UH(W,O) = 3. If he joins with someone who does
not sing he receives payoﬀ UH(W,D) = 2.
We contrast two economies where the number of players of each type is
either zero or as given in this table:
type WH WI OH OL DI DL
number of type in economy S 6 4 2 4 4 4
number of type in economy G 6 4 4 6 4 4
Note that the number of players with crowding type O has increased.10
Two possible core allocations can be detailed as follows:
10As stated the number of players of type OI remains the same at zero. In the two
29
1. Economy S: 4×(WI, OL), 4×(WH, DL), 2×(OH, DI) and 2×(WH, DI).
2. Economy G: 4×(WI, OL), 4×(WH, DL), 4×(OH, DI) and 2×(WH, OL).
Giving core payoﬀs:
type WH WI OH OL DI DL
payoﬀ in economy S 2 3 3 2 2 2
payoﬀ in economy G 1.5 2.5 2 2.5 3 2.5
To see that these represent core states we detail the relevant parts of the
value function: With the following exceptions, the worth of any pair of agents
is 4.
composition total utility composition total utility composition total utility
WH, WH 0 WI, OH 3 DL, DL 0
WH, WI 2 DI, OH 5 DI, DL 2
WI, OL 5 DL, OL 2
WH, OH 2 DI, OL 3
We observe that agents of type OL receive a higher payoﬀ in economy G
despite the increase in agents with crowding type O and type OL. So why,
core states given we could have partnerships (OI,OI) giving core payoﬀs of 2 to players
of type OI . Thus, we could easily consider two economies where the number of players of
type OI also increases by 2.
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intuitively, are agents of type OL able to gain? Given that agents of type
OL like to listen to music they would naturally want to form a partnership
with agents who whistle (crowding type W ) as opposed to those who do not
whistle (D). Conversely, agents of type OH would naturally want to form
a partnership with agents who do not whistle (D) as opposed to those who
do (W ). In economy S it so happens that agents with crowding type W
are doing relatively well and agents with crowding type D relatively poorly;
this has the side eﬀect (or knock on eﬀect, in British English) that agents of
type OL receive a relatively low payoﬀ and agents of type OH a relatively
high payoﬀ. In economy G the increased number of agents of type OH sees
their ‘bargaining position’ reduced and consequently their payoﬀs fall. This
feeds through into an increased ‘bargaining power’ for those agents who do
not whistle and a decreased bargaining power for those who whistle. As the
‘bargaining power’ of whistlers falls agents of type OL are able to increase
their payoﬀ. Basically, there are cross-type influences whereby agents of type
OL gain more ‘bargaining power’ by the increased number of players of type
OH than they lose by the increased number of players with their own type
OL.
Before concluding this section we note that, with more structure on the
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model, as in Brueckner (1994), it may be possible to avoid examples such
as those above. It would be interesting to have further characterizations of
economic situations with crowding types where the law of demand continues
to hold.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we extended the basic approach pioneered by Tiebout to reex-
amine the theory of equalizing diﬀerences. We do this by drawing a connec-
tion between local public goods and the non-wage attributes of jobs. That is,
the attributes that necessitate equalizing diﬀerences, such as danger, cleanli-
ness, climate and the range of local amenities can all be seen as club goods.
The analogy of local public goods led us to consider the crowding types
model of Conley and Wooders. This model has many desirable properties
from a public economic sense and we find these qualities equally useful in the
context of firm and region formation. Thus, the model allowed us to present
a more complete model of equalizing diﬀerences in which we can account for
the compensating wages between diﬀering taste types while also modeling
the markets for diﬀerent productivity and skill levels. In doing so we make
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assumption standard to the literature: free mobility, no redistribution be-
tween clubs (e.g. no governments) and perfect information on the types of
jobs available. We assume that a player’s crowding type is observable and
that crowding types are independent of taste types. We should acknowledge,
that there are some contexts in which these assumptions may not be rea-
sonable. For example, it may not be possible to Fully observe how smart or
honest a potential new employee is, and it may be that smokers (a crowding
type) like to smoke (a taste). However, there are many other circumstances
in which these assumptions can be justified.
Having introduced the model, we turned to an application of particular
interest - whether, following a ceteris paribus increase in the supply of a
factor of production the per-unit return to that factor can increase. The
introduction of compensating diﬀerentials means that taste types become
important parts of the labor market - if one player prefers the attributes
of the firm or region you can aﬀord to pay that person a lower wage. This
creates an independence in the money wage that players with the same skills,
but diﬀerent tastes, can earn and as such the arbitrage to equalize wages that
we would expect within the standard market paradigm no longer applies.
From the general perspective of modeling equalizing diﬀerences there re-
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mains one significant area of further study. Compensating diﬀerentials apply
to a wide variety of attributes, many of which can be modeled as above; the
model can be used to look at regional compensations because of climate, local
amenities and scenery etc. We have also considered firm and individual spe-
cific attributes, which can include cleanliness, vacations, shift work, pension
packages, probability of unemployment and danger etc. The results above,
however, do not apply to compensating diﬀerentials on the basis of human
capital. That is, we have not considered the equalizing variations resulting
from the cost and time spent learning a trade or skills. To do so would re-
quire us to look at the model from a diﬀerent perspective - we have been
comparing the payoﬀ to players with the same crowding type but diﬀerent
taste type, while modeling human capital would require us to consider the
payoﬀs to players with the same tastes but diﬀerent crowding type. This pa-
per shows the way to do this, however, the issue of human capital neatly fits
the model of genetic types introduced in Conley and Wooders (2000). This
paper generalizes the crowding types model so that players are endowed with
a genetic type and not a crowding type. Players then purchase their crowd-
ing types at costs dependent on their genetic type. For example, the genetic
type may be the level of intelligence and people purchase their skill level,
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with players with a higher intelligence finding it cheaper to purchase a high
skill level. This question naturally fits the issue of human capital and would
allow us to present a very interesting discussion of the role education and
training plays in the process of equalizing diﬀerences. One further issue we
note for future consideration is the possibility of players belong to more than
one club. That is, a person joins a firm, then chooses the type of region he
wants to live in and finally chooses the type of jurisdiction, meaning that
an agent belongs to three distinct coalitions, or alternatively an agent may
belong to two firms. This opens up a whole range of issues as to how the
model can be extended and what we can learn from doing so.
In conclusion, this paper has presented a new way of considering two very
old economic issues. Using the crowding types model we have analyzed the
process of compensating diﬀerentials in the labor market and applied this to
question the law of supply. The crowding types model has previously only
been used to model public good economies but clearly it can have a very
interesting role to play in modeling firm formation. This paper has merely
looked at one possible application but there are a whole range of issues that
still remain to be studied.
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